2013年4月29日 星期一

何必來上課 ?

From: Hirota 
發表於 2013-4-30 00:42  

上完這個巴菲特班有個體驗,
跟旁人分享明牌是沒有用的。

之前在讀書會時,有跟同學分享過華固這檔股票,並將投資理念做分享。
結果同學聽了之後,有的認同後有買進,
但是過陣子再問的時候,又賣掉了,
當然是有一大堆有的沒的理由。

就跟MIKE書上寫的,
明明教的是太極拳,
但後來又會跳成霹靂舞。


From: mikeon88 
發表於 2013-4-30 06:08  

是哩!這正是其中奧妙之處。
有人說,巴菲特班的明牌都貼在討論區了,
何必來上課 ?
殊不知重點不在明牌,
而在於觀念要通,
才知何時買,才能抱得住,賺到大錢。

也有人覺得每次上課內容都差不多,
聽過一遍就以為懂了。
要能做得到,不是懂了而已,
而是要達到信仰的境界,
需要經過幾次的回鍋與實際操作經驗的檢討,
把整個道理徹底融會貫通才做得到。
如同孫中山所講的:「思想產生信仰,信仰才有力量」。

這是為何要請同學多來回鍋,多跟我們討論的原因,
本班的價值就在於此。

同學問,為何這麼好願意讓同學免費不限次數來回鍋 ?
我只是覺得既然收了人家6千元就有義務教到會為止罷了。

讓同學來回鍋也表示我的自信,
我的方法經得起考驗,
不怕人家來踢館。

2013年4月23日 星期二

用合併報表分析償債能力是錯誤的

From: weyzhiro
發表於 2012-10-27 02:56

最近合併報表現金約1.5億,短期借款約1.9億,
應該可以周轉過去…


From: mikeon
發表於 2012-10-27 18:23

早上看到這一段分析覺得怪怪的,
剛好今天有一位會計師同學來上課,
特地請教她。
「現金1.5億,短期借款1.9億,應該可以周轉過去」??
這應該用非合併報表來看,而不是合併報表,
因為子公司的現金實際上不可能給母公司來用,
所以用合併報表分析償債能力是錯誤的。


From: weyzhiro 
發表於 2012-10-27 19:49

今年我有投資奇美電,原因很簡單,
因為他有郭董當富爸爸,即使他負債很高......


From: mikeon
發表於 2012-10-28 03:51

同學舉的奇美電剛好是個反證。
即便鴻海是富爸爸,
鴻海的股東願意讓鴻海去償還奇美電的負債嗎?
這違反股份制原則,
當股東頂多把投資金額賠光就算了,
竟然還要去分擔轉投資的負債,
這是個無底洞誰敢投資?
清楚顯示用合併報表的現金與負債去分析償債能力是錯誤的


Bruce 發表於 2013-8-7 13:44  

富爸爸投資法行不通
這個就是一個案例
爛公司就是風險高

奇力歇業,富爸爸群創欲冷眼旁觀


2013年4月20日 星期六

教大家怎麼看營收

每當有人說我不懂得看營收時,我都很想笑。 
他們忘了我是外資研究員出身的,
從20多年前當研究員的第一天起就知道要看營收。
我寫過20-30頁個股大報告好幾本,
不僅翻爛過財報、公開說明書、剪報、產業報告、公司拜訪過好幾次,
要分析到多細都做過。
那些只是每個月追蹤營收或翻幾頁財報,就自以為在分析公司的人,
才是沒寫過研究報告的「外行人」。
現在我就來教大家怎麼分析營收:
追蹤營收不是只看它的成長率,
因為那沒預測性,這個月營收成長,不代表接下來仍會成長。
營收要怎麼分析 ? 要把它拆開,
sales breakdown by product 或 by customer。
by product要看它哪幾樣產品賣得好,
未來能否賣得更好 ? 要去了解它的產品的功能、市場性,
根據供需關係去做市場預測。

by customer要知道前10大客戶是哪幾家 ?
這些客戶的前景又是如何,
就像鴻海的最大客戶是蘋果,占營收4成,
要分析蘋果的產品前景,
才能預估出鴻海營收未來的成長性。

分析過營收之後,接下來要看cost structure,
要知道各產品的成本結構,毛利率
甚至要做敏感度分析,
看各種材料價格上升多少會讓成本增加多少 ?
像IC封裝的材料molding compound、連接線金或銅占成本多少,
1994年Sumitomo的epoxy resin廠爆炸,
就得估出對IC封裝的成本增加多少 ?
這才是成本分析。

講了這麼多,應該知道怎麼分析營收了吧,
絕非只是追蹤成長率那麼膚淺。

以上就是我當研究員的日常工作,
只不過我越來越不認為這是一套對的方法。
就像外資楊應超寫的鴻海聖經,
一定跟郭台銘搞得很熟才能寫出那麼多內部細節,
結果呢 ? 最近把鴻海的目標價調低了。
為什麼 ? 因為外資那一套分析方法也看不了太遠 !!

我現在認為巴菲特的方法才能看得更遠,
一家公司若
1. 過去展現過高ROE的記錄,
2. 配得出現金,
3. 產業地位穩固
就幾乎可以確定是能維持高ROE的公司,
縱使還有少許不確定的部份就透過多種果樹把變壞的風險限制住。
接下來只要在股價便宜時買進,
便保證投資報酬率最大,
除此之外還需知道其它什麼東西呢 ?

跟我一樣把整個道理想通的人,
就曉得真的就這麼簡單了。

請同學好好看一下年報,看巴菲特怎麼分析公司,
是不是我的方法跟衪最接近 !

波克夏年報最精華的一段
若沒時間看完年報,只看這一段就好

2007年報
Businesses – The Great, the Good and the Gruesome
Let's take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we're at it, let's also discuss what we wish to avoid.
Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren't available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stockmarket purchases. It's better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone. A truly great business must have an enduring "moat" that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business "castle" that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company's being the lowcost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with "Roman Candles," companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed. Our criterion of "enduring" causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change 能好很久的標準讓我們排除快速變遷的產業. Though capitalism's "creative destruction" is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.
Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.
But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area's premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership's moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can't name its CEO.

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business 在穩定的產業中具有長期的競爭優勢是我們尋找的企業. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. 高ROE+高成長=great。But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There's no rule that you have to invest money where you've earned it. 高ROE但無法高成長=good,只要把配出來的現金再去找別的投資標的即可。
Indeed, it's often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can't for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return. ROE卻配不出現金,不易長期維持高ROE。
Let's look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See's Candy. The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn't grow. Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years. Indeed, I believe that See's, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry's earnings.
At See's, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972. (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire .) Last year See's sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually. Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See's family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire .
We bought See's for $25 million when its sales were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 million. The capital then required to conduct the business was $8 million. (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.) Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital. Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations. First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable. Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.
Last year See's sales were $383 million, and pre-tax profits were $82 million. The capital now required to run the business is $40 million. This means we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See's has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to "be fruitful and multiply" is one we take seriously at Berkshire .)
There aren't many See's in Corporate America. Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 million to $82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth. That's because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.
A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment. There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 million pre-tax on $400 million of net tangible assets. But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See's situation. It's far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements. Ask Microsoft or Google.
One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety. This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of. It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.

Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow. When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 million, and its net investment in fixed assets was $570 million. Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 million. But capital expenditures have totaled $1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced. (A simulator can cost us more than $12 million, and we have 273 of them.) Our fixed assets, after depreciation, now amount to $1.079 billion. Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 million, a gain of $159 million since 1996. That gain gave us a good, but far from See's-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million. Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business. Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations. For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category. We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.
Now let's move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk , he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.
The airline industry's demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain.
In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.
To sum up, think of three types of "savings accounts." The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.


好學生特質:
產品不變+高市占
產品會變+多角化

2013年4月15日 星期一

臭屁有理 !!

From: 老男人 
發表於 2013-4-15 11:52  

mike 桑: 感謝你的回答。
我是在2011年中把巴菲特班部落格加入我的最愛,不定時會上去瀏覽,
直到2011年底你振臂高呼,力排眾議大戰群雄
(於同學討論區應該找得到,也有很多同學不認同和懷疑),
2012年第一季應為GDP最低點,該進去種樹了。
我還不以為意,直到2013年初才知又錯過了一個循環,
只因當下網路上,2012年前兩季均無人有如此前瞻,
(看前兩季成交量萎縮便知)
先知也 ! 臭屁有理 !!
也只能乖乖的讓你賺那5,530(便當兼講義扣掉),
兩天下來更覺得你真的是高人.........

對不起我所提問的問題提議不清,
應是您如何知道2012年第一季的0.6和第二季的-0.1是最低點開始反轉,
而不是再繼續往下,
當時大盤指數7,000-7,500點,很多人都覺得應會繼續探底,
主計處所提供的數據,我知道只是參考,
但那轉折點如何去判斷出來,
笨學生謝謝你的指教。
而GDP理論準確性我是相信的,
主計處修正預估我也認同你的看法。
根據YoY去判斷又是為何 ?
請不要說我不認真ㄛ,因我都沒打瞌睡,
是因為天資魯鈍。
唉 ! 我也想蹲馬桶悟道,但凡夫俗子怎有能耐...

From: hyc (Shangri-La) 
發表於 2013-4-15 15:04  

上課之前我是當家裡的女王耳提面命提醒我不可以買股票的時候,
通常是市場最悲觀時,
我也是去年第一季瞞著她慢慢買入,
去年度的總資產投報率7%,
今年到三月底已經達到去年相同投報率。
雖然投報率不高(持股比例的管控也是原因之一),
但現在女王也開始信任GDP理論 & 盈再表了 ! 
每當討論入圍名單時,她第一句話:預期投資報酬率 ?

四月初到今天止已出清完一些預期報酬率較低的股票,
一部分轉入預期投報率較高的股票,一部分伺機而動.....
這些也都要感謝Mikeon於去年初買入訊號的提醒



From: vivian(景月) 
發表於 2013-4-16 11:15  

我是2010年上課的,mike說1Q是GDP高點,要減碼。
所以就把手上的股票賣了,尤其是中鋼和裕民等景氣循環股。
現在看來是對的,因為它們已經回到我當初的買價了。

2011年1Q是GDP低點,要買股票,大盤卻一直創新高,
很多同學出來質疑GDP理論不準,其實我內心也有很多雜音。
但Mike一直提醒這是因為景氣循環延長,股票更貴了,更要忍住不要買,
後來我想可能是太多人煩了,
所以mike提供真的忍不住的同學想買就買1/3吧。
我就手癢進去買了一點,這些持股,目前損失10%~20%
現在看來我是錯的。
早知就聽mike的,要忍住不買。

再來,就是2012年1Q是GDP低點,至少要買1/3的股票,
我立刻就進場買了,畢竟我可是等了很久了。
這些持股目前報酬率看來還滿好的,
有小賺5%至10%和報酬率超過50%以上的。
最近打算把接近貴價的股票賣掉了。
這看來也是做對的哦!

謝謝Mike!
也希望mike秉持初衷,
在該買和該賣時,還是能跳出來提點同學。
呵呵!這是我回應的最主要目的。

2013年4月10日 星期三

甲骨文(ORCL)的資料庫不是說換就換

From: dagunding0407 
發表於 2013-4-10 18:04  

dear mike:
請問為何會買ORCL ? 軟體業的產業位不變 ?
為何不選擇MSFT ?


From: mikeon88 
發表於 2013-4-10 19:05  

企業用的資料庫很龐大,不是說換就換












From: id4eric2 
發表於 2013-4-10 21:32  

甲股文是我口袋名單之一,JOE美股名單沒有這一隻,
但是對公司或單位來說資料庫是很難說換就換的,
微軟的資料庫SQL server存的資料量無法與甲股文相比
另外sybase等其他不錯的資料庫 市占率沒它高。

還有要換資料庫是一件浩大的工程,
還有花費幾百萬金額龐大
所以一用都好幾年(10年....),
不會跟PC作業系統幾年就換
因資料庫很重要,維護合約都會簽約。
產業穩定性高。

不過我還沒存夠錢買美股。....


From: mikeon88 
發表於 2013-4-10 21:55  

同學看到沒,作為一個長期投資者,
買股票想抱好幾年的,
判斷產業地位會不會變是比追蹤營收更重要的事。

判斷方法就這麼簡單,
其實我對資料庫軟體一竅不通。


2013年4月9日 星期二

中國A股開戶

From: ywen0713 
發表於 2013-4-10 09:59  

親愛的同學們:
我是全中國第1705號 !!!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~好興奮啊 !!
下面是A股開戶自助法......我寫出來應該不會違法吧 ? 

1. 去買一張飛往上海的機票(往虹橋機場),辦好台胞證,帶好身分證,換好美金 (能帶多少?網上查一下,我記得是一萬美金。)


2. 下飛機記得在大廳買大熊貓巧克力,很好吃,樣子也很可愛。

3. 直奔飯店。
4. 跟飯店櫃台妹妹問:「我要開個銀行戶頭,最近的中國銀行或工商銀行在哪 ?」
5. 去中國銀行或工商銀行,帶上台胞證,跟警衛說,我是台灣人,我要開銀行戶頭,領號碼牌。
6. 臨櫃,簽名,把一萬美金存進戶頭,開戶完成,記得跟櫃台小姐要電話。

7. 下午找一間公安局(就是警察局,說你要辦「暫住證」,填一些資料,暫住地址就寫飯店地址)。

8 . 一大早,伸手招計程車,跟開車師傅說:我要去上海市吳中路2758號,申銀萬國證券。
9. 找到警衛,跟他說:我是台灣人,我要開證券戶頭。
10.檢查台胞證、台灣身分證、銀行卡 (昨天開戶你就應該拿到了),臨時居住證(昨天就跟警察拿到了)。

11. 付九十元人民幣,拿到一張卡,完成。
12. 打個電話給ywen,我們出來喝個茶..
13.  快樂的回家。


From: ywen0713 
發表於 2013-4-10 10:05  

dear my classmates:
1. 一次買一手,一手一百股。
2. 買進不收手續費,賣出千分之一交易稅,網上下單千分之二手續費。
3. 每購買一千股(十手),收一元過戶費。低於一千股也收一元。
4. 新開戶者300開頭的股票不能購買。300屬於新創業板,需要交易滿兩年。
5. 全額買股,買的當下就扣款。
good luck !


From: hdd1234567 
發表於 2013-4-10 10:05  

昆山 MP大樓 裡的中國銀行,跟東吳證有協商
手續費由3/1,000 降到 6/10,000,但是不足5元還是以5元記
去可以找陶行長,大家可以利用


參閱:A股自助開戶法 !